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Displaced Persons and the Politics of International Categorisation(s) 
 
Ten million displaced persons in Europe are stateless, homeless, and 
hopeless. – YMCA, 1946.1 
 
 
It is the processes of labeling as much as the labels themselves which are 
of significance. – Roger Zetter.2 
 
 
170,000 Displaced Persons (DPs) – predominantly Central and Eastern 
Europeans – arrived in Australia as International Refugee Organisation 
(IRO)-sponsored refugees between 1947 and 1952. They were Australia’s 
first, experimental, mass of non-British migrants. This article sets out the 
international historical and political context for the migration of DPs to 
Australia, and interrogates the “bureaucratic labelling” inherent in the 
category ‘Displaced Persons’.3 Contrary to contemporary representations 
as an “anonymous mass”, the DPs were a heterogenous grouping 
politically, culturally and socially.4 Many were never part of the original 
post-war cohort of ‘Displaced Persons’ and only officially became 
‘refugees’ in 1948 in the context of the Cold War, when they became 
‘political refugees’. The DPs were then sold as potential ‘workers’ and/or 
‘migrants’ available to make up the post-war labour shortfall and assist in 
                                                 
1
 F. J. Massey, national general secretary of the YMCA, cited in ‘Millions Homeless and Without 
Hope in Shattered Europe’, The Mercury (Hobart, Tas), 3 June, 1946.  
2
 Roger Zetter, ‘Labelling Refugees: Forming and Transforming a Bureaucratic Identity’, Journal 
of Refugee Studies, Vol. 4, no. 1 (1991), p. 44. 
3
 Zetter, ‘Labelling Refugees’, p. 39. 
4
 Anna Holian, Between National Socialism and Soviet Communism: Displaced Persons in 
Postwar Germany (Michigan, 2011), p. 47. 
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national economic regeneration. This article will describe the historical 
origin of the terms ‘Displaced Persons’, ‘refugees’, ‘political exiles’ and 





The term ‘Displaced Persons’, or ‘DPs’, has become the generic name for 
those groups of people resettled by the International Refugee 
Organisation (IRO) following the Second World War, including those 
technically classified as ‘Displaced Persons’, and the later ‘refugees’ from 
Soviet-occupied countries. Use of the term ‘Displaced Persons’ in 
international parlance began in 1944 when the Supreme Headquarters, 
Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), commanded by the United States’ 
General Dwight D. Eisenhower, attempted to categorise those refugees 
anticipated to be displaced as a result of the war. According to the SHAEF 
Plan for the Allied invasion of Western Europe (Operation Overlord), 
‘Displaced Persons’ would be separate from those ‘refugees’ displaced 
within their own country. ‘Displaced Persons’ were to be specifically those 
outside their national boundaries and either “desirous” but “unable to 
return to their home … without assistance” or who were to be returned to 
“enemy or ex-enemy territory”.5 Displaced Persons were to include: 
                                                 
5
 The National Archives, War Office (WO) 204/2869, War Office: Allied Forces, Mediterranean 
Theatre: Military Headquarters Papers, Second World War, Refugees and displaced persons in 
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Evacuees, war or political fugitives, political prisoners, forced or 
voluntary workers, Todt workers [forced labourers], and former 
members of forces under German command, deportees, intruded 
persons, extruded persons, civilian internees, ex-prisoners of war, 
and stateless persons.6  
 
 
On emergent understanding then, before the end of the Second World 
War, Displaced Persons were those persons who found themselves 
outside their own country, predominantly in Germany and Austria. The 
grouping included concentration camp inmates, voluntary and forced 
labourers, (non-German) soldiers in military units withdrawing westwards, 
and civilian evacuees fleeing west from the oncoming Russian Army. 
These groups were made up predominantly of Jewish and non-Jewish 
Poles, Ukrainians, Russians, Belarussians, ‘Balts’ (Estonians, Latvians 
and Lithuanians), Hungarians, Yugoslavs and nationals of Romania, 
Bulgaria and Albania. Displaced ethnic Germans were the only group 
outside its state borders not included in the Allied’s official category of 
Displaced Person; they were collectively excluded from the group of 
‘deserving’ victims.7 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
the Mediterranean Theatre: administration and movement: policy and correspondence, Supreme 
Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces, Adm. Memo No. 39 (1 January 1944), 
http://www.tlemea.com/postwareurope, viewed 23 November 2010, p. 18. 
6
 The National Archives, London, Foreign Office (FO) 1052/10, Control Office for Germany and 
Austria and Foreign Office: Control Commission for Germany (British Element), Prisoners of 
War/Displaced Persons Division: Registered Files (PWDP and other Series), SHAEF planning 
directive: refugees and displaced persons (DPs) (3 June 1944), 
http://www.tlemea.com/postwareurope, viewed 23 November 2010. 
7
 G. Daniel Cohen, ‘The West and the Displaced, 1945-1951: The Post-War Roots of Political 
Refugees’, PhD Thesis, Department of History/Institute of French Studies, New York University, 
January 2000, p. 45; Dan Stone, ‘Introduction’, Post-War Europe: Refugees, Exiles and 
Resettlement, 1945-1950, The National Archives, UK, and the Wiener Library, London, 
http://www.tlemea.com/postwareurope/essays.asp, viewed 9 December 2009, p. 2. 
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Notwithstanding the exclusion of ethnic Germans, the numbers of officially 
categorised Displaced Persons were staggering. By August 1944 there 
were 7.6 million foreign civilian labourers and prisoners of war working in 
Germany itself, comprising around 29% of the Reich’s industrial labour 
force and 20% of the total labour force.8 It has been estimated that 
towards the end of the war approximately 13.5 million foreigners worked in 
the German economy, and at least 12 million were forced labourers. 
Around 11 million survived the war. There were also several hundred 
thousand foreigners who had been imported into German-controlled 
territories and more than a million forced labourers in the Todt 
Organisation (a Third Reich civil and military engineering group), 
constructing coastal fortifications throughout Northern Europe and 
Southern France.9 In addition, it has been estimated that in May 1945 up 
to 10% of the 7.8 million troops wearing German uniforms were non-
German.10 In all, there were approximately 12 million classifiable 
Displaced Persons in and around Europe at the conclusion of the war in 
May 1945.11  
                                                 
8
 Mark Spoerer and Jochen Fleischhacker, ‘Forced Labourers in Nazi Germany: Categories, 
Numbers, and Survivors’, Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 22, no. 2 (Autumn 2002), p. 
171; Malcolm J. Proudfoot, European Refugees 1939-52, A Study in Forced Population 
Movement (London, 1957), p. 79; Mark Wyman, DPs: Europe’s Displaced Persons, 1945-51 
(Ithaca NY, 1998), p. 22. 
9
 Proudfoot, European Refugees, p. 81. 
10
 David Cesarani, Justice Delayed: How Britain Became a Refuge for Nazi War Criminals 
(London, 2001 [1992]), p. 35.  
11
 The National Archives, FO 1052/10, Control Office for Germany and Austria and Foreign 
Office: Control Commission for Germany (British Element), Prisoners of War/Displaced Persons 
Division: Registered Files (PWDP and other Series), SHAEF planning directive: refugees and 
displaced persons (DPs) (3 June 1944), http://www.tlemea.com/postwareurope, viewed 23 
November 2010; Louise W. Holborn, The International Refuee Organisation: A specialized 
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Representations of the DPs in the immediate post-war period were 
uniformly negative. To the post-war Germans, the DPs were known as 
schlechte Ausländern (bad or dirty foreigners), and “held in the greatest 
contempt”. To Allied military authorities, they were ‘surplus population’ and 
‘a nuisance’: ‘kriegies’ (POWs), ‘goddam DPs’ and ‘lousy Poles’.12 Jewish 
DPs (and it was soon ordered that all Jewish survivors were to be 
categorized as DPs), who made up 20% of the immediate post-war 
refugee population, were described by US General George S. Patton Jr. in 
1945 as “lower than animals”.13 They were all, however, the responsibility 
of the Allied authorities. 
 
After SHAEF ceased functioning in July 1945, the Displaced Persons 
came under the care of American, British and French military authorities.14 
Two international organisations were involved on the periphery: the Office 
of the League of Nations High Commissioner, a merger incorporating the 
                                                                                                                                                 
agency of the United Nations, its history and work, 1946-1952 (London: Oxford University Press, 
1956), p. 395. 
12
 Hulme, The Wild Place, p. 18; Rieko Karatani, ‘How History Separated Refugee and Migrant 
Regimes: In Search of Their Institutional Origins’, International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 17, 
no. 3 (2005), p. 520; UNRRA Archives, Germany Mission, US Zone Office of the Director, PAG-
4/3.0.11.3.0:9, ‘Confidential Report on the General Situation of DPs to the Director General of 
UNRRA, Sep 1946’, cited in Yury Boshyk, ‘Repatriation and Resistance: Ukrainian Refugees and 
Displaced Persons in Occupied Germany and Austria, 1945-48’, in Anna C. Bramwell, Refugees 
in the Age of Total War (London, 1988), p. 202; Michael R. Marrus, The Unwanted: European 
Refugees from the First World War Through the Cold War (Philadelphia, 1985 [2002]), p. 300.  
13
 Leonard Dinnerstein, America and the Survivors of the Holocaust (New York, 1982), p. 16; 
Proudfoot, European Refugees, p. 350; Dushnyck and Gibbons, Refugees are People, p. 12; 
Gerard Daniel Cohen, ‘The Politics of Recognition: Jewish Refugees in Relief Policies and 
Human Rights Debates, 1945-1950’, Immigrants & Minorities, Vol. 24, no. 2 (2006), p. 135. 
14
 Arieh Kochavi, ‘The Politics of Displaced Persons in Post-War Europe, 1945-1950’, Post-War 
Europe: Refugees, Exiles and Resettlement, 1945-1950, p. 2. 
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Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees Coming from Germany and 
the Nansen International Office, and which provided legal protection and 
material aid to refugees from 1938 to 1946; and the Intergovernmental 
Committee on Refugees, which had been set up as a result of the Evian 
Conference in 1938 to assist Jewish migration from Germany and Austria, 
and then in 1943 to care for all refugees.15 The main international body, 
however, was the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration 
(UNRRA), which was initiated in late 1943 so that “preparation and 
arrangements shall be made for the return of prisoners and exiles to their 
homes”.16  
 
UNRRA was a successor of sorts to earlier refugee relief organisations, 
such as the American Relief Administration (1919-1923) and various 
Offices under the auspices of the League of Nations. However, rather than 
relying on charitable and philanthropic bodies, it established an American-
led internationalization of relief operations.17 In November 1943, the 44 
nation signatories of UNRRA agreed not only to care for the DPs, but also 
to relieve war victims at the request of national governments. UNRRA 
would provide basic necessities, with a goal towards rehabilitation. At all 
                                                 
15
 The National Archives, FO 371/51138-0008, Foreign Office: Political Departments: General 
Correspondence from 1906-1967, Future of Inter-Governmental Committee (5 September 1945), 
http://www.tlemea.com/postwareurope, viewed 23 November 2010. 
16
 M. L. Kovacs, ‘Immigration and Assimilation: An Outline Account of the IRO Immigrants in 
Australia’, MA Thesis, Department of History, University of Melbourne, 1955, pp. 182-183; NLA, 
MS 8128, Unpublished manuscript by Harland Gordon (H.G.) Brooks (Department of 
Immigration), ‘Displaced Persons Volume 1’, pp. 4, 7. 
17
 G. Daniel Cohen, ‘Between Relief and Politics: Refugee Humanitarianism in Occupied 
Germany 1945 1946’, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 43, no. 3 (2008), pp. 437, 439. 
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times, UNRRA operated under military jurisdiction and was largely 
dependent on military supplies. Their ‘first and most urgent’ task, however, 
was to organize the DPs.18 UNRRA’s ideological basis for this task was 
not only to “bind up the world’s wounds” but also to propagate an 
American-led “new growth of confidence [in international administration] 
which is indispensable for the future system of general security”.19 
 
The main aim of UNRRA in this period, in relation to the DPs, was to 
assist in refugee repatriation. However, some rehabilitation and material 
support was required until an eventual return home became possible. In 
effect, this meant providing all DPs with food and clothing rations initially 
sourced within Germany and supplemented by Red Cross parcels, and 
housing millions of homeless DPs in around 900 (mostly nationality-
specific) camps across Germany, Austria and Italy, which were often 
former concentration camps.20 In this way, as historian Daniel Cohen has 
described, UNRRA “functioned as an alternative welfare state for stateless 
people”.21 According to the British Army, this “gigantic” task involved: 
Controlling and transporting … men, women and children; the 
setting up or adaptation of camps for them; disinfestations and 
organization of hygiene and sanitation measures … feeding, 
watering, and clothing; checking and documentation; the provision 
                                                 
18
 Jessica Reinisch, ‘Preparing for a new World Order: UNRRA and the International 
Management of Refugees’, Post-War Europe: Refugees, Exiles and Resettlement, 1945-1950. 
The National Archives, UK, and the Wiener Library, London, 
www.tlemea.com/postwareurope/essay4.asp, viewed 9 December 2009, pp. 4, 5. 
19
 Cited in Jessica Reinisch, “’We Shall Rebuild Anew a Powerful Nation’: UNRRA, 
Internationalism and National Reconstruction in Poland’, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 43 
(2008), p. 452.  
20
 Dinnerstein, America and the Survivors of the Holocaust, p. 17.  
21
 Cohen, ‘Between Relief and Politics’, p. 439. 
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of medical attention and supplies, the control of disease, and in the 
case of those who were not to be speedily repatriated, the initiation 
of rehabilitation, education and entertainment.22 
 
 
DPs also received special benefits in a post-war Germany. Many were 
employed by the Allied military authorities, and all received rations of 
American cigarettes to use as black market currency, as well as being 
outside German jurisdiction.23 This reliance on welfare resulted in a new 
characterisation, that of the “professional DP … sitting pretty under the 
protection of UNRRA”.24  
 
The repatriation attempts were successful in part: for many, “there was 
great enthusiasm about going home”.25 The Allied military authorities 
repatriated about 7 million within less than six months after the end of the 
war, and UNRRA repatriated another million over the following 18 
months.26 However, UNRRA soon came up against problematic DPs who 
either had nowhere to return to, or refused repatriation, citing 
“persecution”: all Jews, who were formally classified as ‘stateless’, and 
those (old and new) Soviet citizens who refused to return to communist 
                                                 
22
 War Office 205/139 Public Record Office, Notes on ‘G’ Activities of 21 Army Group during Post-
Surrender Period, cited in Carol Mather, Aftermath of War: Everyone Must Go Home (London, 
1992), p. 16.  
23
 M. L. Kovacs and A. J. Cropley, Immigrants and Society: Alienation and Assimilation (Sydney, 
1975), p. 85.  
24
 Hulme, The Wild Place, p. 70.  
25
 Francesca M. Wilson, Aftermath: France, Germany, Austria, Yugoslavia, 1945 and 1946 (West 
Drayton, Middlesex, England, 1947), p. 83. 
26
 Klaus Neumann, Refuge Australia: Australia’s Humanitarian Record (Sydney, 2004), p. 30. 
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rule in their homelands.27 Others were initially repatriated and then 
returned to the DP camps – these were classed as uncatalogued 
refugees, that is, no longer official DPs, “free-livers” outside the DP camp 
system.28  
 
Soviet Citizen ‘Displaced Persons’ 
 
The Yalta Agreement of 1945 had promised the return of Soviet citizens to 
their pre-August 1939 homes (DPs from areas incorporated into the Soviet 
Union since September 1939 were not to be repatriated nor treated as 
Soviet citizens “unless they affirmatively claim Soviet citizenship”). As 
many Soviet citizens had no wish to return home, repatriation was at times 
forcibly carried out by Allied military authorities “regardless of [the DPs’] 
personal wishes”.29 Ukrainian writer, and DP, Ivan Bahryany explained in 
1947 in an English-language article in the Ukrainian Weekly, why so many 
‘Soviet citizens’ refused to repatriate: 
I am a Ukrainian, 35 years old, born in the region of Poltava of 
laboring parents and now I am living with no fixed residence, in 
constant want, wandering like a homeless cur around Europe —
hiding from the repatriation committees of the USSR, who want to 
send me "home". I do not want to go "home". There are hundreds 
of thousands of us who do not want to. They can come for us with 
loaded rifles, but we will put up a desperate resistance — for we 
prefer to die in a foreign land rather than go back to that "home". I 
put that word in quotation marks, for it is filled with horror, for it 
shows the unparalleled cynicism of the Soviet propaganda directed 
against us: the Bolsheviks have made for 100 nationalities one 
                                                 
27
 Cohen, ‘The Politics of Recognition’, p. 136.  
28
 Hulme, The Wild Place, p. 116.  
29
 Foreign Office 1052/260, Directive from SHAEF to 21 Army Group, 14 June 1945, cited in 
Mather, Aftermath of War, p. 19; Dushnyck and Gibbons, Refugees are People, p. 51.  
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"Soviet home" and by that term they are building the terrible "prison 
of peoples", the so-called USSR.30 
 
This feeling of “horror” in response to the USSR was exacerbated by the 
Soviet persecution of returnees. There was a general assumption in 
Soviet lands that all returnees, particularly POWs (but even forced 
labourers), had been collaborators of the Nazi regime and this led to 
“complicated, often crippled fates” for those forced to return.31 Historian 
Tony Judt has estimated that one in five Soviet returnees were either shot 
or deported to the Gulag.32 Others were turned back at the border by state 
officials, while many DPs received letters from family members warning 
them not to travel home. Soviet officials suggested that loyalty to 
homelands had been softened by the safe and comfortable camp 
environment, where “they do not work hard and they are set in a special 
atmosphere which is not normal”.33  The Soviets alleged that the DPs 
were being “nourished” in the camps as “tools of aggression for foreign 
powers”.34 The forced repatriations by Allied military authorities ceased 
around the end of 1945 as it became apparent that large numbers of 
Soviet repatriates were being met with violence, deported to Gulags or 
                                                 
30
 Ivan Bahryany, ‘Why I Do Not Want to Go “Home”’, Ukrainian Weekly, 17 February 1947, p. 3, 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/16475947/The-Ukrainian-Weekly-194707, viewed 9 February 2010. 
31
 Gelinada Grinchenko, ‘Ukrainian Ostarbeiters of the Third Reich: Remembering Patterns on 
Forced Labour in Nazi Germany’, Conference Paper, 14
th
 International Oral History Conference, 
Sydney, 2007 (unpublished), p. 5. 
32
 Tony Judt, cited in Dan Stone, ‘Introduction’, Post-War Europe: Refugees, Exiles and 
Resettlement, 1945-1950, p. 2. 
33
 Reinisch, ‘We Shall Rebuild Anew a Powerful Nation’, p. 468.  
34
 Cited in Dushnyk and Gibbons, Refugees are People, p. 49.  
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executed as soon as they crossed the border.35   
 
As a result, many DPs concocted false background stories, and an entire 
underground industry grew up providing false identity papers for “Poles 
from the Urals” (that is, Soviet citizens attempting to pass as citizens of 
pre-1939 Poland).36 A British officer noted the difficulties of identification 
and classification for Allied military authorities, and UNRRA: 
Was [the ‘DP’] a Jugoslav? Then he might be a Serbian Chetnik 
who had fought against Tito, but professed undying love for 
England. Or he might be a Tito Partisan, captured by the Germans 
but now escaped and trying to make his way back to Jugoslavia. Or 
again he might be a member of Pavelich’s infamous Ustachi, who 
would no doubt attempt to conceal his identity. Was he a Russian? 
Then he could be a runaway Cossack, or an escaped Red Army 
prisoner, or a Latvian who left Latvia before it became part of the 
Soviet Union, or a displaced Soviet citizen who just did not want to 
go back home.37 
 
The underground industry for false documents consisted of individual 
entrepreneurs as well as emigrant institutions such as the Tolstoy 
Foundation. DP employees of UNRRA were also involved.38 This occurred 
concurrently with the practice of Nazi collaborators hiding their identity, or 
                                                 
35
 See also National Library of Australia (NLA), MS 8128, Unpublished manuscript by H. G. 
Brooks (Department of Immigration), ‘Displaced Persons Volume 1’, p. 12. 
36
 Margarethe Gabriel, cited in Anne Kuhlmann-Smirnov, The Resettlement of Soviet--Russian 
Displaced Persons and the Politics of ‘Fidelity’, Arizona State University, Place of Refuge Panel 
Series, http:www.asu.edu/clas/history/ proj/refugee/articles/kuhlmann.htm, viewed 15 February 
2008, p. 9. 
37
 War Office 170/4461, Public Records Office, HQ 36 Infantry Brigade, War Diary, cited in 
Mather, Aftermath of War, p. 79.  
38
 Kuhlmann-Smirnov, The Resettlement of Soviet--Russian Displaced Persons and the Politics of 
‘Fidelity’, pp. 7, 9; V. L. Borin, The Uprooted Survive: A Tale of Two Continents (London, 1959), 
pp. 128-129; Cohen, ‘Between Relief and Politics’, p. 444; Kim Salomon, Refugees in the Cold 
War: Toward a New International Refugee Regime in the Early Postwar Era (Lund, Sweden, 
1991), p. 73.  
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changing certain biographical details, in order to be classified as DPs.39  
 
Meanwhile, the erstwhile Soviet citizens were joined by Jews and ‘border-
hoppers’ (or ‘infiltrees’) fleeing the East. More than 160,000 Jews left 
Poland between 1945 and 1947 due to the very real danger of pogrom 
actions, while in 1947 the majority of those leaving the Soviet bloc were 
Romanian Jews fleeing via Hungary and Austria.40 Border-hoppers, 
usually young, single males from Czechoslovakia and Hungary, were 
attempting to escape the encroaching Iron Curtain – “Communism-in-the-
making” - in what has been termed the phenomenon of “the Voting 
Feet”.41  
 
By this time, the hundreds of DP camps were regarded as “sociological 
and psychological cauldrons” as the heterogenous groupings of DPs 
battled on ethnic, religious and political grounds.42 One contemporary 
described the DPs as an “incredible, almost comical, melting-pot of 
peoples and nationalities sizzling dangerously in the very heart of 
Europe”.43 Jewish DPs, in particular, were forced to isolate themselves 
from the majority DP camps, characterized by an American reporter as 
                                                 
39
 See, for example, Ruth Balint’s investigation of Károly Zentai’s documented identity changes. 
Ruth Balint, ‘Australia, Hungary and the case of Károly Zentai’, Inside Story, 
http://inside.org.au/australia-hungary-and-the-case-of-karoly-zentai/, viewed 20 October 2010, pp. 
8-9. 
40
 Kochavi, ‘The Politics of Displaced Persons in Post-War Europe, 1945-1950’, p. 3. 
41
 Sandor Berger, An Appendix to An Appendix of Prose, A Supplement to A Supplement of ‘I 
Protest’: The Letters and Articles of Sandor Berger, Australia, 1964-1968 (Sydney, 1968), p. 307; 
Victoria Zabukovec, The Second Landing (Penneshaw, Kangaroo Island, SA, 1993), p. 289. 
42
 Lubomyr Luciuk, Searching for Place: Ukrainian Displaced Persons (Toronto, 2000), p. 143. 
43
 Tadeusz Borowski, cited in Holian, Between National Socialism and Soviet Communism, p. 1.  
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“camps for collaborators”.44  The DPs had to cope with the administration 
of their lives by UNRRA and the occupation authorities, which frequently 
included transfers from camp to camp, as well as deal with local Austrian 
or German officials.45  
 
In this context, a specific DP collective identity, or community, failed to 
emerge in post-war Europe; instead, a sense of “reactive” diaspora and 
exile mission was established.46 The DP camps, or “DP Municipalities”, 
encouraged by UNRRA to have a form of self-sufficiency, were usually 
nationality specific and attempted to keep a (homogenous) national 
sensibility alive through schools, cultural activities, and national 
celebrations and commemoration days.47 Historian Marian J. Rubchak has 
described the camps as “a matrix for cultural preservation, and even 
further development, in a relatively isolated environment”.48 The camps 
                                                 
44
 Cited in Suzanne D. Rutland, ‘Sanctuary for Whom? Jewish Victims and Nazi Perpetrators in 
Post-War Australian Migrant Camps’, Conference Paper, Beyond Camps and Forced Labour, 
The Second International Multidisciplinary Conference at the Imperial War Museum, London, 11-
13 January 2006 (unpublished), p. 12.  
45
 Luciuk, Searching for Place, p. 143; Anna D Jaroszyńska-Kirchmann, The Exile Mission: The 
Political Polish Diaspora and Polish Americans, 1939-1956 (Athens, Ohio, 2004), p. 77. 
46
 G. Daniel Cohen, ‘Remembering Post-War Displaced Persons: From Omission to 
Resurrection’, in Mareike König and Rainer Ohliger, eds., Enlarging European Memory: Migration 
Movements in Historical Perspective (Ostfildern, Germany, 2006), p. 90; Egon F. Kunz, ‘The 
Refugee Experience: Being a Refugee’, Refugees: The Challenge of the Future, Academy of the 
Social Science of Australia, Fourth Academy Symposium, 3-4 November 1980, Proceedings, p. 
123. 
47
 Reinisch, ‘We Shall Rebuild Anew a Powerful Nation’, pp. 470-471; Cohen, ‘The Politics of 
Recognition’, p. 136; Laura Hilton, ‘Cultural Nationalism in Exile: The Case of Polish and Latvian 
Displaced Persons’, The Historian, Vol. 71, no. 2 (Summer 2009), 280-318, 




 Marian J. Rubchak, ‘Dancing with the Bones: A Comparative Study of Two Ukrainian Exile 
Societies’, Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies, Vol. 2 (1993), p. 360. 
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became a training ground for community leaders and modeled a 
community building process to be used after resettlement.49 As well as a 
reconstruction of nationality, then, the DP camps could also be said to 
have provided a construction of national sentiment in diaspora.50  
 
The most obvious example of an emergent identity is that of the Jewish 
survivors of the Holocaust and the state of Israel, which historian Dan 
Diner has argued “had its beginnings [in the Jewish DP camps] in 
southern Germany”.51 These emergent nation-building and/or diasporic 
identities occurred simultaneously with the ongoing excision of the DPs 
from both the polity and historical memory of Germany and the expanded 
Soviet Union.52 Some DP groups were thus fighting not only for national 
and cultural preservation (or, arguably, creation), but also their own 
identity, purpose and agency as ‘nationalists’ and ‘exiles’ rather than 
‘refugees’.53 
 
For UNRRA and UNRRA workers, however, a lack of agency on the part 
of the DPs was assumed. Historian Peter Gatrell has noted that the 
dominant attitude of relief workers seems to have been one of “personal 
                                                 
49
 Jaroszyńska-Kirchmann, ‘The Polish Post-World II Diaspora’, p. 52; Anna Bramwell, Refugees 
in the Age of Total War (London, Boston, 1988), p. 205; Hilton, ‘Cultural Nationalism in Exile’, p. 
297.  
50
 Rubchak, ‘Dancing with the Bones’, p. 360; see also Kavita Datla, ‘Displacement Camps: Sites 
of Ethnic Renewal and Nationalism’, 
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/~ghost20j/classweb/ghost20j/displacement%20camps%20page.html, 
viewed 4 May 2010. 
51
 Dan Diner, cited in Cohen, ‘The Politics of Recognition’, p. 129. 
52
 Cohen, ‘Remembering Post-War Displaced Persons’, pp. 93-94, 337. 
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adventure and self-fulfillment”, together with an individualized and 
collective agency (and developing professionalism) involved in 
overcoming “the arduous and sometimes hazardous nature” of their work. 
They were usually reluctant to ascribe much agency to the DPs 
themselves, and there was little attempt to consult with the DPs about 
their future.54  
 
DPs were described by sociologists and psychologists working with the 
international bodies as “apathetic” and “cantankerous”.55 In one report 
commissioned by the Welfare Division of UNRRA, a summary of “the 
psychology of Displaced Persons” used descriptors such as “[rude], 
[crude] behaviour, aggressiveness and touchiness”, “apathy”, “phantasy-
ridden” and “unreal” thinking, “jealousy”, “recklessness”, “deep 
despondencies”, “hypochondrial complaining” and “mental misery”.56 Peter 
Gatrell has argued that this sort of pathologising of the DPs also 
infantilized them, and justified all forms of external intervention.57 Indeed, 
the UNRRA report suggested that the “tools of repair” were “simple 
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enough” – food, clothing, material help and “administrative guidance”.58  
 
UNRRA tried tactics such as reducing rations and frequently relocating the 
DPs, as well as allowing Soviet representatives undue influence, in an 
attempt to force the DPs home.59 DPs showed some agency by resisting 
these entreaties, and refusing repatriation. In an extensive repatriation poll 
carried out in May 1946, for example, of the DPs in the US Zone, 89% 
rejected repatriation, and 9% refused to participate. Those who refused 
repatriation expressed, in “a more or less violent form, disagreements and 
dissatisfaction with the Soviet regime”. Ukrainians kept insisting on 
referring to themselves as ‘stateless’.60 Some refugees also embarked on 
spontaneous unauthorised journeys around Europe.61 
 
When even bribing the DPs to go home with a sixty-day ration of food 
didn’t work - ‘Operation Carrot’ - it became apparent that UNRRA’s 
primary aim of repatriation was “sheer wasted effort” and that the DPs had 
become, in the words of Daniel Cohen, a problematic “collective 
anachronism”, an irritating remnant of the Second World War in a Europe 
                                                 
58
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which was quickly forming Cold War sides.62  
 
It was argued by the Polish-American Congress (an umbrella organization 
of Polish-Americans and Polish-American organizations formed in the 
United States in 1944), and others, that the United States, and by 
extension the United Nations, had a moral responsibility to solve the DP 
problem, as “their plight is attributable to the Yalta agreement to which 
America was party”.63 For the Communist nations, DPs who refused 
repatriation were “enemies and traitors, not only of their own countries, but 
of all the United Nations”.64 Meanwhile, UNRRA had no authority to keep 
caring for the Jews, border-hoppers and Soviet citizens who refused 
repatriation, and no authority to initiate resettlement.  
 
In this context of “extreme [diplomatic] touchiness”, political debates 
between the three countries (the United States, the United Kingdom and 
France) administering the DP camps in occupied Germany and Austria, 
and the countries of origin of the majority of renegade DPs (the Soviet 
Republics of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, as well as Poland and 
Yugoslavia) took place throughout 1946.65 In April, the International 
Refugee Organisation (IRO) officially replaced UNRRA as a temporary 
agency of the UN. 
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In September 1946 the Special Committee on Refugees and Displaced 
Persons (run by the UN Economic and Social Council) resolved protection 
for: 
3 (b) those persons who have been displaced, as a direct or 
indirect result of the second World War, from their countries of 
nationality or residence, prior to (a specified date), or who were 
outside of their countries of nationality or residence on that date, 
and who definitely, in complete freedom and after receiving full 
knowledge of the facts, including adequate information from the 
governments of their countries of nationality or residence, are 
unwilling to return to those countries and are further unwilling to 
avail themselves of the protection of the governments of those 
countries.66 
 
This definition now included those Soviet citizens who had refused 
repatriation, thus enlarging the category of Displaced Persons under the 
responsibility of the United Nations. 
  
In December 1946 the draft constitution of the International Refugee 
Organisation (IRO), specifying the IRO’s field of operations and promising 
to “find new homes elsewhere” for unrepatriable DPs, was adopted by a 
vote of 30 to 5 with 18 abstentions on 15 December 1946.67 The ultimate 
responsibility for the UN was now to resettle the burgeoning group of 
eligible Displaced Persons, most of whom by this time were unrepatriable 
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Soviet citizens or those who refused to return to their now Soviet-occupied 
homelands.  
 
The IRO (1946-1952) was formally charged with resettling the DPs and in 
the meantime, maintaining and protecting them in the same camp system 
set up by UNRRA (1943-1946).68 The IRO became responsible for the 
“care and control” of 1.5 million DPs and ‘bona fide’ refugees, including 
older generations of League of Nations and pre-war refugees. Those 
ineligible for IRO protection included war criminals, quislings, traitors, 
anybody who had participated in the persecution of civilians of an allied 
nation or voluntarily assisted enemy forces, common criminals, persons of 
German ethnic origin and persons enjoying the financial assistance and 
protection of their country of nationality.69  
 
All these processes established the IRO as a politicised international 
bureaucracy, whose major preoccupation was the categorization of the 
“administrative fiction” of DP eligibility.70 One of its main tasks was issuing 
Identity Cards verifying the holder as a “genuine refugee or displaced 
person” able to access emigration channels.71 This work followed on from 
UNRRA’s screening practices, and in fact the IRO launched a massive 
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review of individual cases already evaluated under UNRRA due to 
widespread “discrepancies and incoherence”.72 The IRO Identity Cards 
certified a politically blameless past, safeguarded the holder from 
repatriation, guaranteed continued maintenance and enabled possible 
resettlement.73  
 
The screening process, while necessary, was not particularly stringent, 
even “superficial and in the eyes of some, ‘corrupt’”. The Eligibility Manual 
“made clear that the IRO was not particularly enthusiastic about screening 
for war criminals”, and that a certain amount of untruthfulness was 
expected.74 Historian David Cesarani has noted that that UNRRA and IRO 
screening was “so weak that, in reality, it was useful only for public 
relations purposes”.75  
 
Even though ‘Displaced Person’ remained the official IRO term for all 
groups under its mandate, and eventuated as the historical signifier of the 
disparate groups in Europe, a subtle change had taken place regarding 
both terminology and eligibility for refugee status.76 A DP could become a 
‘refugee’ if, on refusing repatriation, he or she demonstrated a “valid 
objection” to such repatriation.77  
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 ‘Political Refugees’  
 
After June 1948, in the context of increasing anti-Soviet sentiment, the 
IRO’s eligibility focus changed from “genuine” victims of Nazism to 
anticommunist “dissidents”.78 In this way, and with the stroke of a pen, all 
Soviet citizen DPs and other unrepatriables became ‘refugees’ from 
communism, and indeed by the end of the 1940s the two categories of 
‘displaced persons’ and ‘refugees’ merged into the official appellations 
‘political refugees’ and ‘stateless refugees’.79 
 
The US-controlled IRO concentrated on an evaluation of individual 
‘dissidence’, paving the way for a broader notion of refugees, one which 
privileged the individual over the state.80 The ideal-type refugee was now 
assumed to have ‘genuine’ (democratic) political creeds as well as 
‘genuine’ reasons to fear persecution. This post-war change to individual 
rather than group eligibility (except in the case of Jews, who were classed 
as eligible because they were Jews), with an emphasis on ‘proof’ and 
‘persecution,’ led to an attempt by the United Nations to codify an 
international legal framework for refugees, incorporating a language of 
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protection and individual human rights.81 The 1951 United Nations 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees defined a refugee as a 
person who: 
Owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is 
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the 
protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and 
being outside the country of his former habitual residence … is 
unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.82 
 
The Convention embodied the historical, geopolitical specificity of the DP 
experience as it applied only to people who became refugees as a result 
of events that occurred prior to 1 January 1951, and was obviously aimed 
at the DPs as Western-perceived victims of Communist state persecution. 
Signatories even had the option of limiting their obligations to European 
refugees.83 Academic Gil Loescher, an expert in international refugee 
policy, has noted that “the definition had the added advantage that it would 
serve ideological purposes by stigmatizing the fledgling Communist 
regimes as persecutors”.84 
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From being members of ethnic, religious and political groups, the refugees 
were now under pressure to present themselves to the IRO as individual 
“asylum seekers”.85 Daniel Cohen has identified a “new theatricality” 
imposed by the IRO under this system, where the incentive of refugee 
status encouraged an overemphasized “presentation of self”, such as the 
open expression of fear. In this way, “storytelling” became of primary 
importance in order to fit the Western vision and definition of individual 
political persecution. This “Cold War myopia” privileged the “political 
persecute”, a “true” refugee, over the “false” “economic migrant”.86 In this 
way, the DPs were further homogenized, as they were reduced to a 
question of their Cold War identities.   
 
It can be argued that the IRO’s pressure on individuals to present 
themselves as ‘political refugees’ obviated any of the age-old economic 
motives those from Eastern Europe may have had for refusing repatriation 
and aspiring to resettlement in the West.87 According to one IRO officer, 
motives of adventure and a tradition of economic migration applied to 
“most” of the DPs; others estimated that only 25% of the DPs in August 
1948 were “genuine refugees” as set out by the IRO. In such cases, IRO 
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policy was to reject only the few who were “naïve enough to admit that 
they are economic migrants”.88 
 
Regardless of the motivations or means of escape of the various types of 
DPs, now re-branded ‘political refugees’, by 1948 it was clear that it was 
up to the IRO to solve the problem of how to resettle these ‘Last Million’ of 
internationally recognized DPs, made up of 636,000 DPs under the care of 
UNRRA, 60,000 from camps under military rule, and 16,000 who had 
been under the mandate of the Intergovernmental Committee for 
Refugees, as well as around 900,000 refugees who made their way to the 
West from the encroaching Soviet bloc in the years to 1951.89 The solution 
came as the IRO re-branded the DPs as ‘workers’ and ‘migrants’. As one 
UNRRA relief worker observed in 1947: “Fortunately, the present 
manpower shortage in Western countries has revolutionized the outlook 
for DPs”.90 The emphasis for DPs now was on exchanging their IRO 
identity card to obtain an IRO passport.91 
 
‘Workers’ and ‘Migrants’ 
 
From 1948, the IRO funded migration to any country willing to accept the 
DPs. Some countries, including Turkey and the new state of Israel, 
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accepted DPs from a particular cultural background, and the United States 
accepted a small number as “compassionate cases”.92 However, most 
interested countries were looking for workers to regenerate post-war 
economies. The first European schemes involved recruitments by Britain, 
the Netherlands and Belgium of “bright-eyed [and] healthy” single persons 
or childless married couples as short-term workers to fill industry 
shortages in coal mining and textile manufacturing.93 In Britain a limited 
scheme was initiated for young Baltic women (the ‘Balt Cygnets’) to be 
used as maids or sanatorium attendants for the first three months of their 
stay. Then, around 100,000 non-Jewish DPs were renamed ‘European 
Voluntary Workers’ and defined primarily as labour migrants.94 Canada 
and Argentina were the first countries outside Europe to take advantage of 
the labour potential, with Canada similarly recruiting workers for two year 
‘apprenticeships’ in specific industries, including lumbering, mining, 
agriculture and domestic service.95 In 1948 the United States finally 
passed legislation, the Displaced Persons Act, in order to sidestep earlier 
migration quota restrictions to ultimately admit 400,000 DPs under a 
sponsorship system whereby the (private or organizational) sponsor had 
to guarantee housing and employment. 
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By 1948, then, the eligibility of DPs as both Displaced Persons and 
‘refugees’ had morphed into the “selection, control and regimentation” of 
both the IRO and the international community on “muscle-gathering 
missions”.96 The DPs, who had earlier presented themselves to the IRO 
as Cold War ‘political refugees’, were now coerced into presenting 
themselves to fit recruiters’ needs. For Canadian immigration authorities, 
intellectuals turned into lumberjacks, workers and farmers; for the United 
States, they became farmers and mechanics. In Australia, all DPs were 
re-categorized as ‘labourers’ and ‘domestics’, and required to complete a 
two year work contract. 
 
As well as an emphasis on manual work skills, there was a strong ‘racial’ 
component in the international community’s selections. The United 
Nations reported that “without openly declaring their unwillingness to 
accept Jewish immigrants, the various recruiting missions invariably reject 
all the Jewish candidates”.97 It has also been argued that non-Jewish, 
particularly Baltic DPs, were specifically recruited for British work schemes 
to stem the immigration of non-white Africans and Asians, due to the 
racially-based belief that European DPs were “of good human stock”.98 
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There was a hierarchy of race (and class) in the selection process, with 
middle-class Balts seen as the “elite of the refugee problem”.99 The Grand 
Duchy of Luxembourg recruited single workers with no dependents, Balts 
preferred. In the United States, almost a quarter of all visas were reserved 
for Balts.100 Australia’s first shipments were made up exclusively of the so-
called ‘beautiful Balts’ from Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia - blonde, blue-
eyed migrants who would easily fit into a White Australian demographic. 
 
Historian Laura Hilton has argued that some DP groups were complicit in 
such representations. Poles and Balts depicted themselves to potential 
settlement countries as “strong, handsome, hardworking, God-fearing 
lovers of democracy”.101 In one publication produced in a DP camp, 
Latvians “somewhat eerily emphasized that 60% of the population had fair 
hair and blue eyes”, and that they were physically healthy. They also 
successfully emphasized their anti-communism.102 Some DPs sent letters 
to the governments of potential resettlement countries, assuring them of 
their “race’s” assimilability.103  
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In effect, then, the IRO, admittedly “hat in hand”, presided over and 
administered a “labour-recruitment program on an international scale”.104 
The Soviets alleged that “a real slave trade” was flourishing, with the IRO 
the “main purveyor of cheap labour for the capitalist countries”, and even 
The Times (London) was inclined to agree: “There is a whiff of the slave 
market in the invitations to DPs to enter most countries”.105 Some IRO 
leaders attacked this “skimming of the cream” and “embargo on brains” as 
ruinous, a denial of the organisation’s humanitarian aims.106 However, to 
the recruiting countries the refugees were “immense pools of manpower 
representing every known skill”, and the IRO was soon dubbed by the 
press the “largest travel agency in human history”.107 
 
Although the IRO was intermittently uncomfortable with facilitating the 
recruitment of mass labour, there was also a perception that labour would 
have a moralizing and rehabilitative effect on the DPs, negating the “evil 
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and anti-social consequences of continued idleness”.108 Allied 
employment policies attempted to turn DPs from “slaves of the Nazi 
regime” to “labourers suitable for democracies”, while DP “apathy” was 
contrasted with state and agency “action” in a “grand vision of 
reconstruction and replacement”.109 
 
The actual process of the IRO pipe-line involved individual DPs applying 
for immigration to the IRO, which selected successful applicants through a 
process of medical, professional and biographical reviews.110 The 
recruiting countries then often made their own selections out of these 
successful applicants, entailing a second review process. Those rejected 
by recruiting countries as “sub-standard” included the ill, the infirm, the 
old, and those who stayed to care for them, as well as intellectuals, those 
with too many dependants and single mothers.111 Left to fend for 
themselves, this “minus” or “hard core” had “passed through the sieves of 
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nations”.112 They were the “most truly forgotten human flotsam of the war”: 
“despair was the footnote”.113 In 1949 there were 20,000 seriously 
handicapped persons, 30,000 of their dependents, and approximately 
100,000 others with limited opportunities for resettlement.114 The IRO 
initiated and administered retraining schemes in an attempt to resettle 
these DPs, but with minimal success. Some were accepted by Norway in 
“good-will” transports.115 The rest were somehow to integrate into the 
Germany economy as ‘homeless foreigners’.116 The last operative camp, a 
Jewish DP camp near Munich still housing 177,000 people, was dissolved 
in February 1957; all of the others had closed by 1952.117 1959-60 was 
ascribed World Refugee Year in order to highlight those DPs who still had 
not found a home.118 
 
Despite the failure of the ‘hard core’, and the latent issues of nationalisms 
and agency, the IRO scheme was largely viewed as a political and 
humanitarian success. The immediate post-war ‘Displaced Persons’ had 
been successfully re-categorised and joined by ‘refugees’ and ‘political 
refugees’. The thorny issue of repatriation to the Soviet Union had been 
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tackled head-on with the formation of the International Refugee 
Organisation, and more than one million DPs, now renamed ‘workers’ and 
‘migrants’, were re-settled by the end of 1951. This vision of success was 
nowhere more apparent than in Australia, where DPs were re-branded as 
‘migrant workers’, who were to rapidly become ‘New Australians’.  
 
 
